The Italian Conference on Theoretical Computer Science (ICTCS) is the conference of the Italian Chapter of the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science.
ICTCS 2016 is the 17th edition of ICTCS and will took place in Lecce, from September 7th to September 9th, 2016.
Prof. Giampaolo Bella (University of Catania)
Title: Cybersecurity’s Way Forward: to get Beautiful or Invisible
People do not generally like Cybersecurity. Although they do believe it is somewhat good to have, they often cannot be bothered to go through security defences such as registrations, strong passwords’ choices, PINs’ long waits through the post and all the like. I do believe they are essentially right, especially if modern services are to be enjoyed on the move, while the user is hopping on the tube, or pervasively, while the user is also watching television. Sometimes users have to be bothered to go through such defences otherwise they will not get the service they wanted. They may then be nastily rewarded with senses of disappointment and frustration both if they opted to go on and if their pride or boredom prevented them to.
A layman at a cafe was arguing that he found Cybersecurity especially hideous when he was in a rush to get some service. Almost every researcher who looks at Cybersecurity from the socio-technical angle will agree with that layman as much as I do. This position paper outlines my view of the sole way forward for Cybersecurity: a fork in the road that takes either to Beautiful City or to Invisible City. One may of course refuse the fork and go back on the same road to Old City, where Cybersecurity often failed for a variety of reasons, including purely technical bugs and human-centred mistakes. I will postulate how I envisage Beautiful City and Invisible City to be.
And do not worry you formal methodists: your help will be most appreciated also in the new cities.
Prof. Gianluigi Greco (University of Calabria)
Title: Mechanisms with Verification and Fair Allocation Problems
Whenever the outcome of some social choice process depends on the information collected from a number of self-interested agents, strategic issues come into play and mechanism design techniques have to be used in order to motivate all agents to truthfully report the relevant information they own as their private knowledge. The talk illustrates some general background on these techniques and specific methods that can be applied when some kind of verification on the declarations of the agents is possible. In particular, attention is focused on analysing a class of mechanisms that naturally arise in the context of allocation problems, by proposing to interpret them in terms of well-known solution concepts for coalitional games. Complexity issues arising in this setting are also discussed, and structural requirements are investigated which can be used to identify islands of tractability.
- Submission of Abstracts: 25 May 2016 – not mandatory
- Abstract and Papers Submission: 8 June – 18 June 2016
- Notification of acceptance: 18 July 2016 (accepted papers)
- Final version: 31 August 2016
- Conference: 7-9 September 2016 (final program available)